Chapter 19: Workmen\u27s Compensation by Canning, Daniel A.
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law
Volume 1955 Article 23
1-1-1955
Chapter 19: Workmen's Compensation
Daniel A. Canning
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml
Part of the Workers' Compensation Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Canning, Daniel A. (1955) "Chapter 19: Workmen's Compensation," Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law: Vol. 1955, Article 23.
I 
1 
I 
CHAPTER 19 
Workmen's Compensation 
DANIEL A. CANNING 
§19.1. The statutory presumptions: Presumption of employment 
arising from use of a vehicle. The most important workmen's com-
pensation decision during the 1955 SURVEY year, which also brought 
forth a rare dissenting opinion, was Ferullo's Case.1 The facts were 
that the claimant contracted with a corporation to haul gravel in his 
own truck which, while being driven by himself, tipped over causing 
him injuries. The evidence showed that if the claimant did not want 
to drive he could put someone else on the truck. An hourly rate was 
paid for truck and driver and the claimant paid for his gasoline and 
oil. While driving he could decide how fast to go. It made no differ-
ence to the manager of the corporation if anybody else drove the 
claimant's truck, and at the end of each week he got a bill from the 
claimant. The single member of the Industrial Accident Board found 
that the claimant was an independent contractor and not an em-
ployee of the corporation and dismissed the claim. This finding was 
affirmed by the reviewing board but in the Superior Court the judge 
entered a decree in favor of the claimant from which the insurer of 
the corporation appealed. 
The claimant contended that G.L., c. 152, §26, passed in 1930, 
creates a conclusive presumption that he was an employee of the cor-
poration for purposes of compensation. The pertinent part of that 
statute reads as follows: 
For the purposes of this section any person, while operating or 
using a motor or other vehicle, whether or not belonging to his 
employer with his employer's general authorization or approval, 
in the performance of work in connection with the business affairs 
or undertakings of his employer, and whether within or without 
the commonwealth . . . shall be conclusively presumed to be an 
employee ... 
The majority opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court held that in 
spite of the words "any person" used in the statute the claimant was 
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not an employee of the corporation but was at all times an inde-
pendent contractor. It thus reversed the decree of the Superior Court 
and dismissed the claim. 
At common law if the one to whom a vehicle was loaned had no 
control over the method of driving, the driver remained in the em-
ploy of the owner and did not become the employee of the hirer. A 
fortiori, if the lender drives his own vehicle and retains control over 
the method of driving, he is an independent contractor and not an 
employee of the hirer. But not long before the passage of the 1930 
statute the decisions had held that, even though the driver was in the 
general employ of the insured as an employee, if he drove a vehicle 
and had control over the actual driving he immediately ceased to be 
an employee as to the driving, even if he were driving on a mission 
that was part of his employment. This was the situation which the 
statute intended to remedy and did remedy without undermining the 
established distinction between independent contractors and em-
ployees. Under this construction of the statute the general relation of 
employer and employee must already be in existence. It is not cre-
ated by force of the presumption. In every case involving the amend-
ment of 1930, wrote Mr. Chief Justice Qua for the majority, there was 
an existing employment when the driving began, to which the amend-
ment could attach itself. It was not the purpose of the act of 1930 to 
turn every driver of his own vehicle into an employee of every per-
son for whom he works. If that were so then every driver of his own 
taxicab would be conclusively presumed to be the employee of any 
person who, while about his business, hailed the cab. Nor could the 
act intend that a person such as the claimant would be an employee 
whenever he himself did the driving but an independent contractor 
when he sent another driver with his vehicle. 
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Counihan agreed with the 
ratio decidendi of the Court to the effect that there must be a relation-
ship of employer-employee already in existence before the statute can 
become operative. But, Justice Counihan contended, the evidence 
would warrant a finding that there was an underlying general rela-
tionship of employer-employee and therefore the case should be re-
committed to the Industrial Accident Board for further findings of 
fact. This opinion singled out a statement in the evidence by the 
general manager of the corporation that "I don't believe I ever laid 
off Mr. Ferullo, he was my longest employee," as being sufficient upon 
which to predicate the general employment. However, it can hardly 
be said that the word "employee" in this context was used as a word 
of art. At another point in the evidence it appeared that only the 
regular employees were carried on the books of the corporation as 
such and not persons in the position of the claimant who had made 
similar contracts with the corporation. 
Continuing, Justice Counihan asserted that the single member of 
the Industrial Accident Board had found that the corporation did not 
exercise control over the claimant while he was driving his truck, and 
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had denied compensation without regard to the 1930 statute, relying 
rather on cited cases which antedated the statute. Then, citing 
Manley's Case,2 Justice Counihan stated that compensation is depend-
ent not upon the relationship of the parties solely as to the operation 
of the motor vehicle, as was the prevailing view prior to the 1930 
statute, but rather upon the general relationship of the parties and 
that the single member erred as a matter of law in basing his deci-
sion upon the specific, isolated act of the operation of the vehicle 
which was no longer permitted following the passage of the statute. 
Nor was there in the single member's findings, concluded Justice 
Counihan, a finding that a general relationship of employer-employee 
did or did not exist between the parties, and consequently a recom-
mittal to the board was required for further findings of fact upon the 
evidence already heard.3 
The two opinions agreed that the statute is powerless to create the 
employment status between the parties. The major point of cleavage 
between the two opinions lies in the quantum of evidence deemed 
necessary to establish the conclusions reached. Is the evidence of the 
statement by the general manager sufficient to warrant a finding of a 
general employment to which the statute might attach and perfect the 
employer-employee relationship? Or is this evidence a mere scintilla 
of the sum total of all the evidence and hence insufficient to maintain 
the position taken? Conversely, was there evidence sufficient to sup-
port the findings of fact made by the single member? In Karelis' 
Case,4 this statement is found: "The findings of fact made by the 
board are final if there was any evidence to support them . . . [The 
judge] could overturn the decision only if the opposite result was 
required as matter of law ... " (Emphasis supplied.) From this 
language it would appear that on the evidential question there was no 
necessity for further findings of fact as suggested by the minority 
opinion because there was ample evidence to support the majority 
decision. 
It is also well established within the body of the workmen's com-
pensation law that the question of the relationship of employer-
employee is one of fact, and a finding by the board, when supported 
by the evidence, cannot be set aside even though upon all the evi-
dence a contrary conclusion might reasonably be reached.5 Further-
more, as was stated in Pass's Case6 and DePietro's Case,7 the board was 
2280 Mass. 331, 182 N.E. 486 (1932). 
3 Justice Counihan relied on Lysaght's Case, 328 Mass. 281, 103 N.E.2d 259 (1952), 
as a basis for recommittal. The latter case seems distinguishable since it concerned 
the presumption created by Section 7A of Chapter 156, commented on in §19.2 infra. 
4328 Mass. 224, 102 N.E.2d 773, 774 (1952). 
5 Pass's Case, 232 Mass. 515, 516, 122 N.E. 642, 643 (1919); Beckford's Case, 268 
Mass. 221, 225, 167 N.E. 284, 286 (1929); Wander's Case, 308 Mass. 157, 160,31 N.E.2d 
530,532 (1941); Caton v. Winslow Bros. & Smith Co., 309 Mass. 150, 155, 34 N.E.2d 
638, 642 (1941); Castagna's Case, 310 Mass. 325, 327, 38 N.E.2d 63, 65, (1941). 
6232 Mass. 515, 516, 122 N.E. 642, 643 (1919). 
7284 Mass. 381, 384, 187 N .E. 773, 774 (1933). 
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at liberty to refuse to give credit to any part of the evidence not in 
their opinion entitled to credit. Presumably the board weighed the 
testimony of the general manager but failed to give it the credit and 
weight urged by the dissenting opinion. 
The dissenting opinion states that there is no finding that the rela-
tionship of employer-employee did not exist "apart from the finding 
that at the time of the injury the claimant was operating the truck as 
an independent contractor." 8 The finding that he was an independ-
ent contractor requires nothing further. The finding of one relation-
ship necessarily excludes the existence of the other so that there is 
contained in the positive finding an implied negative finding that the 
other relationship does not and cannot likewise exist. Since the de-
termination of the relationship between the parties is a question of 
fact for the Industrial Accident Board, if all the basic elements of the 
finding are present including a permissible ultimate finding based 
upon sound subsidiary findings with some evidence to support them 
nothing further is required.9 
If the finding by the single member can be construed to contain an 
underlying finding of a general relationship of employer and em-
ployee, this further finding can only be demonstrated by an inference. 
In Lee's Case,lO it was stated that whether inferences are reasonable 
and warrant the findings is a question of law reviewable by the Su-
preme Judicial Court. Therefore, there seems to be no necessity for 
further findings of fact in this regard since inferences are subjected 
to the same legalistic evaluation as findings of fact.11 All factors in the 
Ferullo case, including facts found as well as all reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from the total evidence, were before the Supreme Judicial 
Court.12 The majority seems justified in its decision, considering all 
elements in the case. 
§19.2. Statutory presumptions: Presumption of compensability in 
death cases. A significant decision concerning the interpretation of 
the important presumption created by G.L., c. 152, §7 A, enacted in 
1947, came before the Court in LeBlanc's Case.1 The employee was 
found crushed to death on a freight elevator after he had been told on 
several occasions that he was not permitted to use elevators without a 
licensed operator in attendance. There was no evidence he was do-
ing anything connected with his work as a stock boy. Section 7 A pro-
vides in part that where the employee is killed or unable to testify 
"it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the 
contrary, that the claim comes within the provisions of this chap-
s 331 Mass. at 646, 121 N.E.2d at 864. 
9 Rozek's Case, 294 Mass. 205, 207, 200 N.E. 903, 904 (1936). 
10279 Mass. 357, 360, 181 N.E. 198, 199 (1932). 
11 See Gianfriddo's Case, 319 Mass. 566, 567, 66 N.E.2d 710, (1946). 
12 See the Court's ruling regarding an inference drawn by the single member in 
LeBlanc's Case, 332 Mass. 334, 125 N.E.2d 129 (1955), considered in §19.2 infra. 
§19.2. 1332 Mass. 334, 125 N.E.2d 129 (1955). 
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ter . . " The Court said that the statute does not mean that the 
death of an employee which occurs at the place of his employment and 
during his working hours, but concerning which there is substantial 
evidence tending to show it is disconnected from and unrelated to 
his employment, is compensable. Where such evidence exists, the 
statutory presumption disappears and the decision is then based upon 
the entire evidence. All the evidence showed that the employee had 
no right to be in the place where his death occurred. The claim was 
therefore dismissed. 
The Court in this case stated that it could not accept the inference 
of the single member adopted by the board that the employee might 
have been caught by the elevator as he was looking down or up into 
the elevator shaft trying to locate the elevator, because that inference 
rested on conjecture and surmise. 
If there had been any doubt before this decision of what was required 
in the way of proof of a compensable claim under this presumption 
there remained no doubt following it. The law placing the burden of 
proof on the claimant was not changed by the presumption, said the 
Court. The Court had already indicated in Lapinsky's Case2 what 
would be required: "We are not to be understood as deciding that 
mere proof of an injury with nothing whatever to indicate that it had 
any connection with the contract of employment would be a suffi-
cient foundation for making the presumption apply ... " 
§19.3. Statutory presumptions: Presumption of total dependence 
of surviving spouse. The presumption of the total dependency of 
surviving spouses of claimants was before the Court in two decisions. 
In the first decision, Cellurale's Case} the employee died leaving a 
widow in Italy. He had lived with her there for a short time following 
their marriage when by mutual agreement he came to this country 
without her. Some years before his death the employee bought a 
dwelling and land in Italy where his wife lived and from which she 
derived an income through the sale of crops produced on the land. 
The employee occasionally sent her money. The single member of 
the Industrial Accident Board found the wife to be wholly dependent 
upon the employee and also found that the wife was not voluntarily 
living apart from the decedent. 
General Laws, c. 152, §32 provides: 
The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be 
wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: (a) A 
wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his death, 
or from whom, at the time of his death, the department shall find 
the wife was living apart for justifiable cause or because he had 
deserted her. The findings of the department upon the questions 
of such justifiable cause and desertion shall be final. 
2325 Mass. 13, 16, 88 N.E.2d 642, 644 (1949). 
§19.3. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 785, 127 N.E.2d 787. 
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The Court reversed the board and decided that from the evidence 
the separation of the claimant and decedent was by mutual agreement, 
that consequently no presumption arose and the finding or ruling was 
tainted by error of law. The Court further stated that since the claim-
ant received profits from the sale of products of the farm she was 
only partially dependent. She was receiving income from sources 
other than the earnings of the employee and was not wholly dependent 
on those earnings. 
Under our statute, the claimant must be dependent upon the "earn-
ings" of the deceased employee and not be "supported" by him. In 
the present case the Court referred to Derinza's Case,2 where the Court 
said that if housing is provided from some other source than the 
"earnings" of the employee, it cannot be said that the wife is wholly 
dependent upon those "earnings." 11 Hard cases can be visualized 
from the present statute concerning dependency. If, for example, 
the employee, by frugality, should save enough from his earnings 
with which to establish a trust fund for the support in whole or in part 
of his family, would the court inquire into the source of the trust res? 
Or, would the Court be compelled to find that the statute provides 
only for dependency upon earnings and decide the matter without 
the application of the statutory presumption? 
In Lopes' Case,4 also decided during the 1955 SURVEY year, the Court 
dealt with the case of a husband dependent upon the wife. The 
claimant husband had been permanently disabled before his wife's 
death and after his illness the wife worked and supported him. Later, 
with the consent of his wife, he went to the Cape Verde Islands to live 
because of the warm climate. There was no disagreement between 
the husband and wife and it appeared that she sent him money to stay 
there. After a few years and following her death he returned to this 
country on the advice of a doctor because he was getting no better. 
The single member found the claimant had been living with his wife 
within the meaning of the conclusive presumption of Section 32(b). 
This was affirmed by the reviewing board. The Supreme Judicial 
Court held there was evidence to support the findings of the board 
and they were not wrong as a matter of law. The insurer relied on 
the fact that the claimant was not actually living with his wife at the 
time of her death. The Court said, however, that there was "a home 
and a life in it" which was carried on by the wife during the tempo-
rary absence of the husband because of illness. 
The point involved in the decision had never been passed upon by 
any prior decision of the Court. 
Slight additional facts such as the employment of the claimant while 
living in the Cape Verde Islands would have placed the case in exactly 
the same light as Cellurale's Case. In Lopes' Case it appeared that the 
2229 Mass. 435, 118 N.E. 942 (1918). 
3229 Mass. at 445, 118 N.E. at 947. 
4332 Mass. 39, 123 N.E.2d 217 (1954). 
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claimant paid his passage home from the sale of some property he 
owned there. It did not appear what kind of property it was-
whether income-producing property or not. There was no evidence 
to show how valuable the property was, the nature of the claimant's 
title, the source of the title (for it might have been bought by his wife 
for him as in Cellurale's Case), how much he received for it when he 
sold it, or whether he had any other property there. In Derinza's 
Case,5 a further hearing before the Industrial Accident Board was re-
quired by the Supreme Judicial Court to clarify the question of the 
value of a house in which a widow and children lived in Italy in order 
to determine the question of whole or partial dependency. 
It is doubtful how far the Court will go in these "home by intend-
ment cases." However, the facts in each case will be closely scruti-
nized because of the ease with which the evidence could be made to fit 
the law. 
§19.4. Compensable injuries: Eye infection from external causes. 
In Morrison's Case,! the employee, after handling drums containing 
chemicals, wiped his face with some rags. Immediately afterwards he 
felt a burning sensation in his eye. The eye became swollen and in-
fected and had to be enucleated. There was no evidence of an abra-
sion of the eye when the doctors examined the employee within a 
short time, since any evidence was destroyed by an infected ulcer 
which developed. The only other way the infection could have lodged 
in the eye was through the blood stream, but there was no evidence of 
this. The single member found the injury arose out of and in the 
course of the employment. The self-insurer appealed from a final 
decree entered in the Superior Court. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held the evidence was sufficient to 
show that something had gotten into the eye from the outside and that 
the infection had not originated within the employee's body. The in-
jury occurred while he was engaged in the performance of his duties 
as a truckman although he had momentarily stopped to wipe off the 
perspiration from his face. The injury arises out of the employment 
if it arises out of the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of 
the employment - in other words, out of the employment looked at 
in any of its aspects. The Court cited cases from foreign jurisdictions 
for its authority that entrance of bacteria from an external source into 
the eye of an employee while engaged in the performance of his duties, 
causing infection in the eye, is a compensable injury. 
Evidence warranting the finding of the single member was ample 
and the Court held there was no error. The decision is sound and is 
supported by medical testimony that it was probable for the employee 
to get such an infection in the manner testified to by the employee. 
The decision is the first of its kind under our cases, but is not sur· 
11229 Mass. at 446-447,118 N.E. at 947. 
§19.4. 1332 Mass. 658, 127 N.E.2d 191 (1955). 
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prising in view of prior decisions concerning the contracting of tuber-
culosis by a nurse2 or the injury to eyes from inadequate lighting.s 
§19.5. Legislative developments. Some twenty-four changes were 
made in the Workmen's Compensation Act 1 during the 1955 SURVEY 
year, only the most significant of which are here set forth. 
Chapter 777 of the Acts of 1955 amends Sections 34, 34A, and 35 
so as to increase the maximum weekly benefits from $30 to $35 per 
week. 
Chapter 366 of the Acts of 1955 amends the third paragraph of para-
graph (4) of Section I by bringing employees of telephone companies 
subject to the Federal Communications Act within the coverage of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. Previously the act had been merely 
elective as to employees of such employers. 
The coverage of the act was still further extended by Acts of 1955, 
c. 755,2 which gave mandatory coverage to domestic servants, whose 
employers formerly had an election to come under the provisions of 
the act. 
By Acts of 1955, c. 681, a new section, 74A, was added to C.L., 
c. 152, extending compensation to such employees of any govern-
mental unit as furnish aid to any other governmental unit than the 
one by which they are regularly employed when so requested and 
when deemed necessary by the head of their department. 
Chapter 234 of the Acts of 1955 repeals Section 76 and amends 
Section 65, thus eliminating the restrictions of the previous law and 
putting employees in the granite industry who contract silicosis or 
other pulmonary dust diseases on a par with others for compensation 
benefits. 
:I Perrin's Case, 325 Mass. 6, 88 N.E.2d 637 (1949). 
SPell v. New Bedford Gas Be Edison Light Co., 325 Mass. 239, 90 N.E.2d 555 (1950). 
§19.5. 1 G.L., c. 152. 
:I Amending G.L .• c. 152. §1(4). 
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